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Finally, courts should simply not admit prior-crimes evidence
that fails to meet the requirements of the balancing test. Woods
provides a good example: the evidence concerning the children who
most likely died of diptheria, malnutrition or pneumonia should not
have been admitted because it was less conclusive of the defendant's
guilt than it was prejudicial. Nevertheless, the majority approved the
admission of that evidence, which had increased rather than de-
creased the likelihood of prejudice at the trial level. While it is diffi-
cult to determine the specific effect which that evidence had on the
jury, "there is a reasonable possibility that [improper evidence]
contributed to the conviction, ' 62 and therefore Judge Widener may
have been correct in his conclusion that the trial court conviction
should have been reversed.
6 3
JOHN C. SHELDON
HART V. COINER: MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE
PURSUANT TO THE WEST VIRGINIA RECIDIVIST
STATUTE HELD CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
The eighth amendment to the Constitution provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."' It has always been assumed that
these words prohibit the imposition of barbaric or torturous punish-
ments.2 While not a clearly defined constitutional principle, it has
also been recognized that the amendment applies to punishments
which are grossly disproportionate to the underlying offenses.3 In the
recent case of Hart v. Coiner,4 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied this latter view of the eighth amendment to invalidate a
sentence imposed pursuant to the West Virginia recidivist statute.
5
"484 F.2d at 145, quoting, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
-Judge Widener's conclusion was based on the assumption that none of the prior-
crimes evidence should have been admitted. 484 F.2d at 139.
'U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
2Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Wilker-
son v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
3See text accompanying notes 16-30 infra.
'483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
'WEST VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966) provides:
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The significance of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hart is two-
fold. First, the Fourth Circuit struck down a mandatory sentence
under a constitutionally valid statute6 as violative of the eighth
amendment; and second, in reaching this result, the court laid down
explicit guidelines to be used in determining whether a given sent-
ence is unconstitutionally excessive in relation to the underlying of-
fenses. The Hart decision will inevitably affect future application of
the West Virginia recidivist statute because the trial courts will now
be required, despite explicit legislative intent, to consider the offenses
underlying the statute's application to determine whether the man-
datory life sentence is disproportionate and therefore invalid. The
ramifications of the decision may also carry over to the application
of other recidivist statutes with mandatory sentencing provisions.
Hart came before the Fourth Circuit on appeal from a denial by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.7 Dewey Hart had
been sentenced under the West Virginia recidivist statute to life im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary. The basis of Hart's petition was
that the mandatory life sentence, as applied to him, was so dispropor-
tionate to the offenses underlying the application of the statute that
it violated the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments.8 Hart asserted in the alternative that, even if
the court found his sentence valid against his eighth amendment
challenge, the sentence should be struck down because he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel during one of his previous con-
victions If there had been ineffective assistance, that conviction
When any person is convicted of an offense and is subject to
confinement in the penitentiary therefor, and it is determined, as
provided in section nineteen [§ 61-11-19] of this article, that such
person had been before convicted in the United States of a crime
punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, the court shall, if the
sentence to be imposed is for a definite term of years, add five years
to the time for which the person is or would be otherwise sentenced.
Whenever in such case the court imposes an indeterminate sentence,
five years shall be added to the maximum term of imprisonment oth-
erwise provided for under such sentence.
When it is determined, as provided in section nineteen hereof,
that such person shall have been twice before convicted in the United
States of a crime punishable by a confinement in a penitentiary, the
person shall be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life.
(emphasis added).
'See note 31 infra.
,Hart v. Coiner, No. C-70-78-E (N.D. W.Va., Sept. 15, 1972).
483 F.2d at 139.
'Id. at 138 n.2.
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would be void for purposes of applying the recidivist statute.'0
The three offenses on which the application of the recidivist stat-
ute to Hart had been based were a conviction in 1949 for writing a
check for $50 on insufficient funds, a 1955 conviction for transporting
two forged checks totaling $140 across state lines, and a conviction
in 1968 for perjury at the murder trial of his son." The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of the petition and summarized its
decision: "[Tihe West Virginia recidivist statute's mandatory life
sentence is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the underlying
offenses, and so grossly excessive that it amounts to cruel and unu-
sual punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment."'
2
The majority decided that Hart had received effective assistance
of counsel and therefore predicated its decision on the petitioner's
first asserted ground for relief, which required an analysis based on
the eighth amendment.' 3 However, the minority questioned the pro-
priety of reaching this constitutional issue, and argued that the ma-
jority's reliance on the eighth amendment was both unsupportable
and unnecessary.'" While reaching the same conclusion as had the
majority, the minority would have based its decision on the alterna-
"See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
"483 F.2d at 138. Section 61-3-39 of the West Virginia Code provides the punish-
ment for writing a check for fifty dollars or more on insufficient funds to be not less
than one nor more than five years and a fine of not more than $1,000.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides the penalty for transporting forged checks in
interstate commerce to be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
than ten years, or both.
Section 61-5-3 of the West Virginia Code provides the punishment for perjury to
be not less than one nor more than ten years.
11483 F.2d at 138 (emphasis added).
'"For a historical development of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). See also Note, Revival of the Eighth Amend-
ment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 996 (1964); Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (1961).
"1483 F.2d at 145. While the dissenting judge, Senior Circuit Judge Boreman,
stated that the decision was unsupportable he gave little indication of why he came
to that conclusion. He said only, "I think my brothers will concede that there is a
paucity of authority bearing upon the Eighth Amendment and that its application to
the severeity of prison sentences has never definitely and conclusively been deter-
mined." Id. at 149.
It would seem that Judge Boreman questioned whether the mandatory sentence
was subject to eighth amendment attack because the West Virginia recidivist statute
and the sentence it imposed had been held constitutional by the Supreme Court. Id.
at 147. See note 31 infra. The dissent believed the decision in Hart "effectively devital-
ized" the statute and left too many questions unanswered. 483 F.2d at 149.
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tive ground that Hart had been denied effective assistance of counsel
during one of his prior convictions. As the dissent emphasized, decid-
ing the case on this rationale would have avoided a direct confronta-
tion between the state statute and the Federal Constitution.
5
In analyzing the Fourth Circuit's decision, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the eighth amendment actually prohibits punishments
which are disproportionate in relation to the underlying offenses.
While it is clear that, at a minimum, the eighth amendment prohibits
the infliction of inhuman and barbarous punishments,'6 the question
of whether it also applies to excessive or disproportionate sentences
has never been conclusively decided by the Supreme Court. The ar-
gument that there was such an application was first articulated by
Mr. Justice Field's dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont:
7
The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the
character mentioned, but against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severeity are greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged. The whole inhibition is against that
which is excessive either in the bail required, or fine imposed,
or punishment inflicted.'8
The issue was not discussed by the Supreme Court again until
1910 in Weems v. United States. Weems had been convicted under
the laws of the Philippine Islands for falsifying a public document.
For this offense he was sentenced to fifteen years of cadena temporal,
which provided for hard and painful labor with chains at the ankles
and wrists, plus certain accessory penalties. The accessory penalties
included civil interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualification from-
voting and holding public office, and subjection to life long surveil-
lance.2" The Court found that the statute imposed a sentence which
was cruel and unusual. Its decision was based on the conclusion that
the punishment was excessive in relation to the offense committed.
In speaking of the punishment the Court said, "[i]t is cruel in its
excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows im-
"See text accompanying note 57 infra.
'"See note 2 supra.
' 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
"Id. at 339-40. In O'Neil the majority did not deal with the eighth amendment
issue because it had not been assigned as error and because it was, then, believed that
the provisions of the amendment did not apply to the states. In Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment was applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
1217 U.S. 349 (1910).
-'Id. at 364.
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prisonment. ' ' 2' It was considiered significant that the statute ap-
peared "to be independent of degrees. ' 2 In other words, even though
the statute provided sentences of three different lengths, the mini-
mum sentence of twelve years was imposed regardless of the culpabil-
ity of the offender, the monetary gain received, or the injury in-
flicted.?
In a recent case, Furman v. Georgia,24 the Supreme Court elabo-
rated on its conceptualization of the eighth amendment. In that case
all nine justices wrote separate opinions, so that the exact scope of
the decision is difficult to determine. However, the per curiam opin-
ion stated, "[tihe Court holds that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 7, The various concurring opinions, which all reached the con-
clusion that the death sentence as applied was cruel and unusual,
were based on such diverse considerations as substantive due pro-
cess, 2 equal protection,27 and disproportionality. 5 The opinions of
Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Brennan considered the death
penalty strictly in terms of the eighth amendment and clearly es-
poused the proposition that the amendment prohibits dispropor-
tionate sentences.29 Thus, while some judges and commentators may
still question whether the eighth amendment prohibits excessive or
disproportionate punishments, 30 it appears that the Fourth Circuit in
Hart had ample legal precedent for its interpretation of the amend-
ment.
Even though the eighth amendment may be construed to prohibit
excessive or disproportionate sentences, further inquiry must be
made to determine whether such an interpretation of the amendment
211d. at 377.
1Id. at 365. The Court noted:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from
the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a




21408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11d. at 239-40; accord, Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970).
2408 U.S. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
rId. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
21See note 28 supra.
1'See 408 U.S. at 375-405 (Bruger, C.J., dissenting). See also Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. Rzv. 1071 (1964).
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was properly applied by the Fourth Circuit to the facts in Hart. A
careful consideration of the facts is crucial since Hart did not attack
the constitutionality of the statute, but only its application in his
particular case. The West Virginia recidivist statute had twice been
upheld by the Supreme Court against a number of constitutional
attacks, including a charge that the mandatory sentence imposed by
the statute was cruel and unusual per se.31 Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit took the position that the constitutionality of the statute on
its face did not preclude an inquiry to determine whether the punish-
ment imposed on Hart was violative of the eighth amendment.3 The
court summarized this distinction when it said: "We are not pre-
cluded from deciding this issue, we think, by the fact that the West
Virginia recidivist scheme is constitutional as written, for a conced-
edly valid statute may be applied in a particular case in such a way
as to violate various constitutional provisions.
'33
'Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616
(1912).
In Graham the statute was attacked for violating the due process, equal protec-
tion, privileges and immunities, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishments
clauses and was upheld. On the subject of cruel and unusual punishment the Court
merely said, "[nior can it be maintained that cruel and unusual punishment has been
inflicted." Id. at 631.
In Oyler the statute was sustained against due process and equal protection at-
tacks. The petitioner claimed that the statute was being applied in an unconstitutional
manner because it was not applied to all who were subject to the law. 368 U.S. at 454-
56. See also Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30, 37
(1956). However, the Court held that since petitioner had not stated why the statute
had not been invoked against all those subject to it, nor had shown selection based on
any unjustifiable standard, that no grounds establishing a denial of equal protection
had been alleged. 368 U.S. 454-56.
For cases upholding recidivist statutes see, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S.
673 (1895). For a detailed discussion of recidivist statutes see Comment, Recidivism:
The Treatment of the Habitual Offender, 7 U. RicH. L. REV. 525 (1973).
1:483 F.2d at 139.
31d. (emphasis in original).
The court cited three cases in support of its statement that a statute valid on its
face can be applied in an unconstitutional manner. The cases are: Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
In Yick Wo the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal ordinance which gave the
board of supervisors of San Francisco discretion in granting or withholding permission
to use wooden buildings as laundries. The Court noted that even if a law is valid on
its face it may be applied so as to result in a denial of equal protection. 118 U.S. at
373-74.
The Court reached a similar result in Edwards. It found that in arresting, convict-
ing, and punishing the petitioners for the common law crime of breach of peace, under
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
By stating the proposition in this manner the court was arguably
approving unlimited judicial intrusion into the legislative function.
When a court declares unconstitutional a sentence which falls within'
the limits set by the legislature, the court is, in effect, overriding the
express power of the legislature to define crimes and provide for their
punishment.3 While some judicial control over these legislative pre-
rogatives is, of course, necessary if the provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution are to be anything other than advisory, the Supreme Court
has yet to provide meaningful standards to be applied by the judici-
ary in measuring the constitutionality of a particular sentence. How-
ever, the courts are conscious of the tremendous power the eighth
amendment gives the judiciary and have generally exercised that
power only in cases where the sentence involved was "clearly and
manifestly cruel and unusual. ' 35 The Supreme Court noted in
Weems:
[Pirominence is given to the power of the legislature to define
crimes and their punishment. We concede the power in most
of its exercises. We disclaim the right to assert a judgment
against that of the legislature of the expediency of the laws or
the right to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power
to define crimes and fix their punishment, unless that power
encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In such
the circumstances disclosed by the record, South Carolina had infringed the petition-
ers' constitutional rights. 372 U.S. at 235.
Language used by the Supreme Court in Brown is noteworthy. Petitioners were
convicted for violating a breach of the peace statute for congregating in a public room
of a segregated library. The Court said:
Accordingly, even if the accused action were within the scope of the
statutory instrument, we would be required to assess the constitu-
tional impact of its application, and we would have to hold that the
statute cannot constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' ac-
tions in the circumstances of this case.
383 U.S. at 142.
A recent case lends strong support to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hart. In Moore
v. Coiner, 303 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. W.Va. 1969), the court voided a sentence pursuant
to a recidivist proceeding on the ground that the application of the statute in that
particular case did not satisfy the purpose of the recidivist statute.
For cases declaring sentences to be cruel and unusual see, e.g., Goss v. Boman,
337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd.,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alas. 1968); Stephens v.
State, 73 Okla. Crim. 349, 121 P.2d 326 (Crim. Ct. App. 1942); Commonwealth ex rel.
Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971); State v. Kimbrough, 21, S.C.
348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
31See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
2Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1934).
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[a] case not our discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined
and imperative in its direction, is invoked.
3 6
Thus, before declaring a punishment violative of the eighth amend-
ment, a court should be convinced that the sentence is so grossly
excessive that it has the duty to interfere and enforce the constitu-
tional prohibition.
Therefore, it appears that in order to determine whether a given
sentence is grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense, a court
should apply a set of carefully delineated standards in order to guard
against an improper incursion into the legislative function. While
such standards have never been formally provided by the Supreme
Court, the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan in Furman do give detailed presentations of standards
which can be used to determine whether a given punishment is cruel
and unusual . 7 However, these opinions indicate only that a punish-
ment which is grossly disproportionate would be cruel and unusual;
they do not provide a framework to be used in determining whether
a punishment is grossly disproportionate.
The second significant aspect of the Hart decision is that the
Fourth Circuit set forth guidelines to be considered cumulatively to
test whether a punishment is so grossly disproportionate to the under-
lying offense that it is cruel and unusual. The factors set forth by the
court were: (1) the nature of the offense itself;3 (2) the legislative
purpose behind the punishment;3 9 (3) comparison with punishments
for the same crime in other jurisdictions; 0 and, (4) comparison with
11217 U.S. at 378.
17n Furman Mr. Justice Brennan enunciated four principles which, considered
cumulatively, provide a test by which a court can judge whether a given punishment
is cruel and unusual: (1) a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to
the dignity of human beings; (2) the State may not arbitrarily inflict a severe punish-
ment; (3) a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society;
and, (4) a severe punishment must not be excessive. 408 U.S. at 274-79.
Mr. Justice Marshall also enumerated four "standards for decision" which were
similar to the principles enunciated by Mr. Justice Brennan. Justice Marshall's stan-
dards for decision provide that a punishment is cruel and unusual: (1) which involves
so much physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate it; (2) which
is unusual, meaning it was previously unknown as a penalty for a given offense (if such
a punishment is intended to serve a humane purpose it may be permissible); (3) which
is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose; (4) which is not excessive and
serves a valid legislative purpose, but which popular sentiment abhors. 408 U.S. at 330-
32.
"483 F.2d at 140; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 81, 101 (1958).
-"1483 F.2d at 141. Legislative purpose was considered by Mr. Justice Marshall in
Furman. See note 37 supra.
"483 F.2d at 141. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 81, 102 (1958).
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punishments available in the same jurisdiction for other offenses.41
The court analyzed these criteria and determined that the sentence
imposed on Hart violated the eighth amendment.
The first factor focuses on the punishment in light of the nature
of the offense. The court found it significant that none of Hart's
convictions was for a crime which involved violence or danger to any
person. The court also closely analyzed Hart's 1949 conviction and
noted that it was "very nearly trivial. 42 According to the West Vir-
ginia Code,43 the offense of passing a bad check for less than $50 is
punishable by confinement in the county jail and not the peniten-
tiary. Thus, if Hart's check had been for one penny less, the convic-
tion could not have been used in the recidivist proceeding. The court
also noted that, while Hart's conviction for perjury was more serious
than the bad check convictions, the perjury offense occurred at the
murder trial of his son, which forced Hart "to choose between his
duty to tell the truth and family loyalty."44
After application of the first of its four factors to the facts in Hart,
the Fourth Circuit then examined the legislative purpose of the West
Virginia recidivist statute under which Hart had been sentenced. The
primary question in regard to the purpose of the statute was the
extent to which a sentence must serve a valid legislative purpose. The
approach taken by Mr. Justice Brennan in Furman seems reasonable:
"Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive
may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the
crime, the more significant basis is that the punishment serves no
penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment. '45 The
majority in Hart followed this approach. The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia has found the purpose of the statute to be the
protection of society from habitual criminals," and the deterrence of
criminals from future violations.47 The sentence of life imprisonment
would surely deter Hart from passing any more bad checks and pro-
tect society from the inconvenience and monetary loss his actions
might cause. However, the court noted that life imprisonment is the
1483 F.2d at 142. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
"483 F.2d at 141.
1
3
WFST VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-39 (1966).
"483 F.2d at 140.
11408 U.S. at 280. The third of Mr. Justice Marshall's standards for decision in
Furman states that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is excessive and serves no
valid legislative purpose. 408 U.S. at 331. See note 37 supra.
"State v. Stout, 116 W.Va. 398, 180 S.E. 443 (1935).
"Dye v. Skeen, 135 W.Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681 (1950). See Moore v. Coiner, 303 F.
Supp. 185 (N.D. W.Va. 1969).
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most severe punishment available under West Virginia law48 and ap-
parently did not believe such severeity was necessary to protect so-
ciety from an individual like Hart or to deter Hart from committing
future offenses. 9
The third factor considered by the court involved a comparison of
the West Virginia recidivist statute with similar statutes in other
states .5 The court's examination of this factor revealed the West
Virginia statute to be the most severe of the statutes in force at that
time. The court noted that only three other states required a manda-
tory life sentence, and that even in those jurisdictions, a life sentence
was imposed only after conviction for three felonies. 5' The West Vir-
ginia statute makes the life sentence mandatory after the third con-
viction which could result in a sentence in the penitentiary; the word
"felony" is not used. Other state statutes which provide for a life
sentence after a certain number of felonies allow judicial considera-
tion of the underlying offenses, making the sentence discretionary. 5
A comparison of Hart's sentence with sentences in the same juris-
diction for other offenses comprised the fourth factor considered by
the court. The court noted that in West Virginia a mandatory life
sentence is imposed for only three other crimes: first-degree murder,
rape, and kidnapping.5 3 The court indicated its position that the
mandatory sentence required by the recidivist statute was excessive
as applied to Hart when it asked: "[C]an it be rationally urged that
Hart is as dangerous to society and as deserving of punishment as the
murderer, rapist and kidnapper?" 5
After completing its analysis of these four factors, the majority
reached the conclusion that "the sentence imposed upon Hart is con-
stitutionally excessive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offenses he committed, and not necessary to achieve any legiti-
mate legislative purpose. ' '5 This result, although based on substan-
tial precedent, is extraordinary in the breadth of its incursion into the
"483 F.2d at 141.
"gId.
51Id.
5'Id. The court only listed three other states which require a mandatory life sent-
ence, but it appears that Washington also has such a statute. IND. ANN.°STAT. § 9-
2207 (Burns repl. vol. 1956); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.190 (1973); TEX. PENAL CODE
art. 63 (1952); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1961).
According to the appendix in Hart, forty-five states have habitual offender stat-
utes, 483 F.2d at 143-44.





legislative function. However, the gravity of this incursion is some-
what mitigated by the explicit and detailed standards the majority
provided by which to judge whether a given sentence is unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate. The court's selection of these standards
further mitigates this incursion in that at least two of the court's
standards necessitate careful consideration of legislative judgments. 6
While the opinion of the majority seems to be a well reasoned
application of eighth amendment analysis as developed by the Su-
preme Court in Weems and Furman, the dissenting opinion is of
particular importance in that Judge Boreman, though agreeing with
the result, provided another basis for the decision. Judge Boreman
took the position that the majority should not have decided the
eighth amendment issue because to do so involved "reaching beyond
the well established bounds imposed upon the federal judiciary by
principles of self-restraint, comity, and the wise exercise of discretion
in the uses of judicial power."5 7 He would have overturned the sent-
ence on Hart's alternative ground for relief, namely that Hart had
been denied effective assistance of counsel in his 1949 conviction.
Hart had raised this issue at the trial level and a hearing had been
conducted to determine the validity of his conviction, but the district
court ruled that there had been effective assistance of counsel, and
the majority of the Fourth Circuit agreed with that conclusion."
The issue of the right to counsel has been intensly litigated in the
last two decades. 9 This right has a significant effect on the applica-
3See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra. The third standard set out by the court
involved a comparison of the mandatory life sentence given Hart with punishments
for the same crime in other jurisdictions. The fourth standard involved a comparison
of Hart's sentence with punishments available in the same jurisdiction for other offen-
ses. Both of these standards are evidence of the weight the Fourth Circuit gave to
legislative determinations. Thus while the court questioned the constitutionality of the
mandatory sentence as applied to Hart, it did so within a legislative framework.
1-483 F.2d at 147. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 211 (1960);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
11483 F.2d at 138 n.2.
5'The right to counsel, granted by the sixth amendment, took on added signifi-
cance after the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
which held that in a capital case due process of law required the appointment of
counsel in those cases where the defendant was unable to employ his own attorney.
This holding has been greatly enlarged by two recent Supreme Court decisions.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court held that counsel must be
furnished to all indigent defendants charged with felonies. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court enlarged the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to include misdemeanors and petty offenses which involve the possibility of a jail
sentence.
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tion of recidivist statutes because of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Burgett v. Texas." In Burgett the Court held that to admit
prior convictions where the defendant had been without counsel in
order to impose a more severe sentence under a recdivisit statute was
inherently prejudicial. Therefore, only convictions in which the de-
fendant had been represented by counsel could be used in determin-
ing the applicability of the recidivist statute."
It has been further recognized that if the right to counsel is to
afford any protection to defendants, that right must include the re-
quirement of effective assistance of counsel. 2 Several Fourth Circuit
cases reflect the well established principle that late appointment of
counsel raises a presumption of ineffective assistance which the state
can rebut only by bringing forth clear proof that no prejudice re-
sulted."
This requirement of effective assistance of counsel is significant
because Hart contended that his assistance by counsel in 1949 had
been ineffective. Counsel had not been appointed for Hart until the
day he entered his guilty plea,"4 and Hart testified that he had spoken
with his attorney for only a short time immediately before he entered
his guilty plea. 5 When the appointed attorney asked him if he was
guilty, Hart "told him that I was guilty for they had my name on the
check."' ; The charge was not discussed further. The majority con-
cluded that no prejudice resulted from the late appointment of coun-
sel because "the accused in fact had no information to communicate
to the lawyer which could have been helpful to the defense. 6 7 Hart's
statement to his attorney was apparently viewed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit as an admission of guilt.
1'389 U.S. 109 (1967).
"The holding of Burgett was recognized and followed by the Fourth Circuit in
Williams v. Coiner, 392 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968). See State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287,
440 P.2d 907 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of Arizona held that an otherwise
valid misdemeanor conviction may not be the basis for a defendant being sentenced
under a recidivist statute, if the defendant was not represented by and did not volun-
tarily waive counsel at the first trial. See Comment, Right to Counsel-Valid Misde-
meanor Conviction Cannot be Used as Basis for Recidivist Sentence if Defendant Was
Not Represented by Counsel at Misdemeanor Trial, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1012 (1968).
'McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
"See Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1970); Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d
624 (4th Cir. 1967); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Virginia,
365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966); Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963);
Turner 'v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963).
"1483 F.2d at 145.
'"Id.
161d.
"Id. at 138-39 n.2, quoting Turner v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852, 854 (4th Cir. 1963).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The majority's consideration of this issue does not seem to have
recognized the importance of the time element in effective represen-
tation. If an attorney is to represent a defendant effectively he must
be given the time necessary to investigate the facts of the case and
to formulate a defense to the charge.68 Hart's attorney would have had
a much greater chance of formulating a valid defense had he been
given sufficient time to reflect on the case.69
Judge Boreman's analysis of the circumstances surrounding
Hart's 1949 conviction leads to the conclusion that Hart was in fact
denied effective assistance of counsel. He took the position that the
late appointment of counsel and the lack of clear proof7" that no
prejudice had resulted provided convicing evidence that Hart's rights
had been violated.' Further support for this position was available
since the facts tended to show that an invocation of the recidivist
statute was threatened to coerce Hart to plead guilty in the 1949
proceedings.7 2 The case then could have been decided on other
grounds and "[an unseemly clash between the federal constitution
and the provisions of a state statute, as applied, would thus be
avoided."
7' 3
Although the majority's eighth amendment analysis seems to be
sound, it also appears that there is substantial support for the dis-
sent's position that a decision upon alternative grounds would have
been more appropriate. By deciding the eighth amendment issue, the
Fourth Circuit has apparently overridden express legislative intent
without actually declaring the West Virginia statute itself unconsti-
"xSee Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 1966).
"In Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963), the court noted, "it is not
for a lawyer to fabricate defenses, but he does have an affirmative obligation to make
suitable inquiry to determine whether valid ones exist." Id. at 353.
7
1Turner v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963).
1483 F.2d at 146 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
-Hart had a prior bad check conviction in Indiana. 483 F.2d 138-39 n.2. At the
hearing held by the district court, Hart testified that his appointed counsel informed
him that the prosecutor intended to proceed against him as a second offender if he did
not plead guilty. Id. at 145. Hart's attorney in the 1949 proceeding testified that the
prosecutor told him: "[Ilf he wants to plead guilty, we will forget his previous convic-
tion, and won't add the additional five years. If we have to go to all the bother of trying
the case, and he is found guilty, why then we will put the five years onto it." Id. at
145 n.1.
In Carr v. Coiner, 296 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. W.Va. 1969), the court took the position
that if a promise not to invoke the recidivist statute induces a plea of guilty which
would not otherwise have been entered, the plea would be considered involuntary. If
the plea was involuntary then the conviction is void and cannot be used in a recidivist
proceeding. McClure v. Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928, 930 (N.D. W.Va. 1964).
p483 F.2d at 147.
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